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entity
entity only if that entity can fulfill
reciprocal
reciprocal duties. Most of Watson's
article is an attack on Singer's view
of animal rights. He argues that rights
must be
be earned and that sentient beings
who cannot be moral
moral agents cannot be
said
said to have rights.
A moral agent is defined as any agent
that does, or intends to, fulfill duties.
This requires that the agent have the
following characteristics: (1) se1f
self
consciousness (knowledge that something
is happening to oneself), (2) capability
of understanding moral principles
about rights and duties, (3) freedom
to act either according to or opposed
to given principles of duty, (4)
understanding of given principles of duty,
(5) physical capability of acting accor
ding to duty, and (6) intention to act
according to or opposed to given principles
of duty. This is referred to as a re
ciprocity framework.
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Richard Watson attempts to provide a
justification for
for ascribing moral
moral rights
to humans
humans but not to (most)
(most) animals
or nature.
He takes the conventional
nature.
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to
rights,
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which
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Watson claims that the mere possession
of sentience or life does not endow an
entity with the right to life or to
relief from unnecessary suffering.
The capacity for physical or mental
suffering is not a sufficient condition
of having interests or rights. The
reciporocity framework is not arbitrary
or self-serving in the sense that it
applies to humans only. Many animals,
he concedes, meet the six criteria:
"Some chimpanzees, gorillas (probably
dolphins,
orangutans and perhaps gibbons), dolphins.
whales), elephants, dogs.
dogs, pigs.
pigs,
(probably Whales),
and maybe cats and some other animals
are sometimes moral agents." (128)
nature, corporations,
Given this framework nature.
the State, and the Church do not qualify
entities. Watson addresses
as moral entities,
arguments designed to justify treating
persons, as responsible
corporations as persons.
moral agents. He argues that the
abstract entities
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suffering, his framework does in fact
rule out of the moral realm most ani
animals and many human beings, namely,
those who will never have or recover
the status of a moral agent. Although
we have no duties with regard to such
nonmoral agents, Watson suggests that
we should treat them with kindness.
This moral imperative is derived from
the fact that we assign "secondary
rights" to nonmoral agents and nature.
The assignment "is made as a convenience
to human interests and does not result
in 'real' rights and duties." (p. 105)
Watson never explains why self-conscious
self-consciousness should-be considered the determinant
of rights. The reciprocity framework
is a recommendation and is advanced on
the assumption that natural rights do
not exist. In addition to begging the
issue of species ism as presented by
Singer, Watson obscures the distinction
between merited rights and other types
of rights that can be granted even if
natural rights do not exist. His
arguments do not establish that it
makes sense to consider the right to
life as an eamed
earned right equivalent to
the right to vote or attend a private
meeting.
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